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I. Introduction
The past decade has been one of enormous change for the organic food industry. By the late 1980's, the
4lack of national uniformity in organic foods and consumer confusion about competing food labels threatened
to stunt the growth of the industry.1 In response to this imminent market failure, Congress acted to bring
much needed stability and regulation to organics. Beginning with the enactment of the Organic Foods
Production of Act of 1990, continuing throughout the recommendation-generating process embodied by the
National Organic Standards Board, and culminating in the most recent and currently ongoing stage of the
National Organic Program's regulation drafting enterprise, the organic debate has raged constantly for over
nine years. The fundamental goal behind all these developments has been the implementation of a system
for organic regulation which would ensure customers that they were getting what they paid for: food free
from chemical adulteration.
What is at stake is truly amazing. The organic industry now controls a nearly $4 billion a year market,
with sales growth forecast at a fourfold rate during the next decade.2 What used to be a market comprised
of a small minority of health-conscious Americans is now encompassing the most mainstream of homes;
in recognition of this trend supermarkets are even moving away from segregating organic foods.3 Beyond
our shores, the organic industry is also thriving, with Europe, Japan, and the other Pacic Rim countries
serving as the leading importers of American organic products.4 The exponential growth present worldwide
in organics is attributable to a general increase in the concern over food safety as well as the success of many
international, national, and regional promotional campaigns.5
1Kenneth C. Amaditz, The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 and Its Impending Regulations: A Big Zero for Organic
Food?, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 537, 540 (1997).
2Curt Anderson, USDA to Regulate the Production of Organic Foods for First Time, DAILY RECORD (BALTIMORE),
Dec. 16, 1997, at 9.
3Anon., No Matter What Shape Regulations Take, Organic Food Industry is Thriving, FOOD & DRINK WEEKLY, May
4, 1998.
4Suzanne Vaupel, Advising Producers of Organic Crops, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 137, 139 (1997).
5Ben Lilliston & Ronnie Cummins, Editorial, Organic vs. \Organic": The Corruption of a Label, ECOLOGIST, July 17,
1998, at 195. See generally Vaupel, id. at 137-140.
5On the production side of the equation, we see that producers have growing incentives to invest in organic
foods. While the industry has traditionally been comprised of small businesses with limited individual
production capacity which typically could charge exorbitant prices for their goods, thereby passing along
the nal production expense to consumers, now competitive market forces are taking hold.6 The overall
production cost for organic food has declined due to the elimination of most chemical inputs and the resultant
lowered vulnerability to input price variations.7
The scope of the organic debate has embroiled more constituents than simply consumers and producers of
organic food. What is fascinating throughout this progression of events is the high level of public discussion
and comment which has been generated. At each step along the way various interest groups such as small
organic farmers, private organic certiers, politicians, international community members, large agri-business
lobbyists, environmental groups, consumers and general taxpayers have all added their voices to the debate.
Complicated with each expression of a diering viewpoint, the USDA and other parties instrumental to the
ongoing drafting of regulations for the National Organic Program have the formidable task of coming up
with a cohesive, prudent, and enforceable regime for the organic industry.
The original timetable for the implementation of organic regulations has long since been proven to be unreal-
istic, and this paper will demonstrate that the necessity to quickly resolve this debate and enact substantive
regulations is great. Now that we are over nine years into the drafting process, the time has come to nally
synthesize the divergent comments into a workable set of regulations. Unfortunately, if the organic industry-
6Anon., supra note 3.
7Vaupel, supra note 4, at 150.
6observer has learned anything since 1990, it is that the momentum of the USDA's bureaucratic machinery
has nearly slowed to a stand-still, and the once polarized constituent groups have become even further polar-
ized and unwilling to compromise. Therefore, the prospects of a successful enactment of meaningful organic
regulations anytime in the near future grow dimmer with each passing day.
Recognizing the current state of aairs and hoping to add a unique overview approach to the debate, the
purpose of my paper is four-fold. First, I attempt to provide an accurate and comprehensive overview of the
substance of the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, the recommendations of the National Organic Stan-
dards Board, and the National Organic Program's Proposed Rule (issued in December, 1997). In addition,
I track various interest groups throughout this process and discuss their public reactions to each of these
three important stages. My third goal is to synthesize the comments generated by each action and attempt
to glean common themes and suggestions for moving forward. Finally, by undertaking a rigorous academic
overview of the many divergent and unique voices in the organic debate in this manner, I formulate my own
suggestions on how best to advise the USDA to put dierences behind it and to move forward. As noted,
this eld is in a constant state of ux at this point in time, and I intend to generate positive options for the
successful enactment of National Organic Program Regulations, which is the goal Congress has been striving
for since 1990.
After compiling and evaluating all my research, I reach the fundamental conclusion that if more institutional
energy had been invested at each stage of this decade-long process to original congressional intent and to the
incorporation of comments and suggestions from all interested and informed parties, the recent Proposed
Rule would have been much more acceptable on the whole. One interesting characteristic of this paper is
its reliance upon opinion articles and the like which are written by constituents such as small-town farmers
and environmentalists. While there have been some legal scholarly pieces written in response to the current
7drafting crisis, I chose not to limit myself to simply academic works in researching this paper.
It appears that much of the debate generated after both the enactment of the OFPA and the issuance
of recommendations by the NOSB was not eectively analyzed and synthesized into the National Organic
Program's Proposed Rule. My options for moving forward, therefore, are driven by a recognition of this fact
and my proposal is to simply tap into the vast resources that have made themselves available to the USDA
in the form of comments to the Proposed Rule. The currently ongoing revision of the rule should address
the common interests and themes expressed in these grass-roots suggestions so that the chances of successful
implementation of an organic regulatory regime can nally become a reality.
II. Background and Original Expressions of Congressional Intent
Organics began in the 1960's and 1970's as a response to proliferating chemical use in conventional agricul-
ture.8 The actual denition of \organic" food had been much debated throughout the industry's existence.
Up until recent eorts to revise the denition, when a product was labeled as certied organic, it simply
meant that the producer had undergone an unregulated inspection process. Generally speaking, that certi-
cation process began when the grower or processor completed an application that described the farm history
or plant operation and other management practices. Inspectors would then visually validate the application
information as being correct. Provided that the farm or facility was approved, it was certied for one year
and could therefore label its food \organic."9
8Jeanette Marie Pontacq, Editorial, Give Organic Farming a Boost, SAN FRAN. CHRONICLE, March 4, 1998, at A19.
9Annie Kirschenmann, About Certied Organic (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://www.organic.org/1/aco.html>.
8It is important to note that throughout the history of the organic industry, the focus has been on this over-
all process of production rather than the actual end-product. Indeed, the hallmarks of traditional organic
systems have remained constant: crop rotation and diversication, cooperation with ecological systems and
cycles, a focus on net return rather than gross income and yields, and the minimization of external inputs,
particularly non-renewable resources.10 An examination of the congressional history of the Organic Foods
Production Act of 1990 reveals that these fundamental principles were also intended to remain constant
throughout the required regulations. Congress intended to retain the traditional systems-based approach to
organic production that had characterized the industry since its inception. This holistic view is reinforced
by language in the Senate Report, which notes that \dening organically grown food based on production
materials and a three-year transition period alone is not sucient. Organically grown food is produced using
farming and handling systems that include site-specic farm plans."11
Against this backdrop of a holistic view of organics, Congress received many petitions to the Committee on
this legislation from people across the country calling for a national organic program; a demonstration that
the activism we currently see in this debate has been present throughout.12 Importantly, the actual drafting
process of the OFPA of 1990 was formitively shaped by comments received from industry participants.
In 1989, three bills were introduced that contained organic food provisions. The Organic Foods Act intro-
duced by Senator Leahy included a denition, a certication scheme, a promotion program, and a pilot label
program. Additionally, the Farm Conservation and Water Protection Act introduced by Senator Fowler and
the Conservation Enhancement and Improvement Act introduced by Senator Lugar both included denitions
for organic production.13 The industry applauded these eorts, but argued that rather than trying to re-
invent the wheel, the national program should take advantage of the network of private organic certication
10John Bell Clark, Impact and Analysis of the U.S. Federal Organic Food Production Act of 1990 with Particular Reference
to the Great Lakes, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 323, 324 (1995).
11S. REP. NO. 101-357 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656.
12Id..
13Id.
9organizations that were already in existence.14 In response to such comments, on February 8, 1990, Senator
Leahy introduced S. 2108, a revision and compilation of the earlier eorts which proposed a partnership
between government and private organizations in standard setting and classication.15
A national regulatory scheme was primarily intended by Congress to serve as an equalizing measure for all
then-applicable state regulations. In the Senate Report, there is a reported example of the way minor dier-
ences in organic milk standards created havoc for the industry. While New Hampshire and Texas required
that dairy cows be fed exclusively organic feed, states such as Kansas, Maine, and South Dakota required
unmedicated feed, and others such as California and Oregon specied time periods during which certain feed
must have been used.16 Obviously, the practical ability for any member of the organic community|from
the farmers through the ultimate consumers|to reasonably discern what the organic milk standards were
was slim.
In addition to nation-wide comity, there were a couple of other driving forces behind the OFPA. Congress
opined on the benets of harmonizing standards internationally, and applauded such organizations as the
Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements for facilitating the trend.17 The then-lacking organic livestock
regulations were also cited as an example of an area in need of national regulation. Because up until this
point the USDA had explicitly prohibited meat and poultry from being labeled as organically produced,
there was no incentive for such manufacturers to employ organic methods.18 In sum, the imposition of a
system which would both domestically and internationally align the monetary incentives of producers and
consumers of organic food was an overaching congressional objective.
14Id.
15Id.
16Id.
17Id.
18Id.
10It is crucial to keep this legislative history as the relevant backdrop throughout this paper's subsequent
examination of the Organic Foods Production Act, the National Organic Standards Board, and the newly
released National Organic Program's Proposed Rule. It is remarkable to note the transformation that has
occurred throughout the past decade in terms of institutional goals and constituent reactions beginning from
the 1990 congressional intent baseline outlined above.
III. Reaction to Organic Foods Production Act of 1990
A. Overview of Content
In order to ultimately gain an appreciation of the tumultuous occurrences of 1998 in connection to the
National Organic Program Proposed Rule, we must start at the beginning. That commencement is the
passage of the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (hereinafter referred to as the \OFPA" or \the Act"),
which ultimately provides authority for the recent Proposed Rule.19 In addition, the OFPA establishes the
National Organic Standards Board (NOSB) to advise the USDA on all OFPA implementation.20 In spite of
constant activity resulting from the mandates of the OFPA, it is striking to note that the regulations which
were to be drafted soon after this statute's passage have been on the drawing board for nine years now,
violating the strict timeline of OFPA.21
Although this statute lacks the detail and precision of the recent National Organic Program Proposed Rule, it
19USDA, Glickman Announces Publication of National Organic Program Proposed Rule (visited Dec. 30, 1998)
<http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/12/0442>.
20Amaditz, supra note 1, at 541.
21Clark, supra note 10, at 325. Congress had hoped that the regulatory scheme they originally envisioned would be imple-
mented by 1993. 7 U.S.C. 6505(a)(1)(A).
11adequately fullls its purpose of giving the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) generally and the Secretary
of Agriculture specically the responsibility for developing and implementing a national organic certication
program based on three overarching goals: establishing national standards for the organic industry, assuring
consumers of the content of their purchases, and facilitating interstate commerce.22 In a nutshell, OFPA
does not undertake dening the word \organic,"23 yet provides that those who cannot meet the stipulated
and forthcoming national standards are barred from making any organic labeling claims.24
1. Mandated Activities. Much of the OFPA concerns setting the foundation of a national labeling system.25
In order to gain an Agriculture Department seal, raw products must be 100% organic and processed foods
must contain 95% organic ingredients. On the second tier of organic foods, a label reading \made with
certain organic ingredients" may be axed to processed foods containing 50-95% organic content. Finally,
those products with less than 50% organic content must specify the organic ingredients contained therein.26
State programs may contain standards that are even more restrictive than the federal program so long as
they do not discriminate against organically produced foods from other states.27 Importantly, the drafters
of the OFPA appear to condone the presence of more rigid state regulations, since the Act mandates that
the USDA must approve any reasonable state plan that meets the enumerated requirements.28 In line wth
this rigidity of regulations, the drafters also knowingly chose a tough standard for processed food to put an
end to consumer confusion, yet allowed for some exibility by providing the Secretary of Agriculture with
22USDA, AGRICULTURE FACT BOOK 98, CH. 12 (1998). See generally 7 U.S.C. 6501 (1990).
23Although the term \organic" is not dened by the OFPA of 1990, this statute does eectively grant USDA a monopoly
over the use of the word. Lilliston & Cummins, supra note 5, at 195.
24Amaditz, supra note 1, at 540.
257 U.S.C. 6505 (1990). Note that in 6505(a)(1)(A), Congress species that the domestic products' label scheme should be
implemented by October 1, 1993.
26See generally Amaditz, supra note 1, at 542-543. See also Anderson, supra note 2, at 9.
27Amaditz, supra note 1, at 543-544.
28The original labeling implementation schedule envisioned by Congress proved to be unworkable. Ideally, after September
of 1992 no other label would have been allowed that claimed that a food was in any way organic or organically produced. S.
REP. NO. 101-357, supra note 11.
12some discretion regard the use of the term \organically produced" as it pertains to individual ingredients
within a given product.29
Each organic producer must establish a long-term \Organic Farm Plan," which relies extensively on the
notion that a three year transition period is required before products grown in any eld can be labeled
as organic.30 As dened by the Act, the term \organic plan" means a plan of management of an organic
farming or handling operation that has been agreed to by the producer or handler and the certifying agent
and that includes written plans concerning all aspects of agricultural production or handling described in
the chapter including crop rotation and other required practices.31
In considering the proper scope of OFPA, Congress ultimately chose to include record-keeping, enforcement,
and international trade provisions. Specically, OFPA requires all producers, handlers, and processors
to keep detailed records of their activities in order to demonstrate compliance with the organic growing
process.32 Although certiers, state agencies, and various federal agencies are endowed with the responsibility
of enforcing the OFPA, the Act grants de-certication power exclusively to the certiers.33 The Act does
include provisions to accommodate imports of organically produced products from third-world countries,
and this international aspect of the organic regulations will become crucial when following the development
of the National Organic Program throughout the last decade.34 Overall, then, the scope of the OFPA is
29S. REP. NO. 101-357, supra note 11.
30Vaupel, supra note 4 at 148. Note that the imposition of a three year requirement addresses the process-based focus of the
OFPA. The selling of an end-product is but one step in a lengthy organic growing cycle.
317 U.S.C. 6502(13) (1990).
32Vaupel, supra note 4, at 145-147.
33Vaupel, supra note 4, at 144. See also AMS, OFMA Meets with AMS|Will the Rule be Delayed?, Oct. 26, 1998 (visited
Jan. 5, 1999) <http://web.iquest.net/ofma/ams.htm>. These materials stress that the need for de-certication arises when a
product was once in compliance with federal organic regulations, but has since become in violation of the Act.
34Terence J. Centner & Kyle W. Lathrop, Dierentiating Food Products: Organic Labeling Provisions Facilitate Consumer
Choice, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 30, 46 (1996).
13aptly characterized as fairly far-reaching, although the Act fell short of encompassing petitions such as the
one to the FDA to extend OFPA's application to include organic hair and skin care products.35
2. Exceptions. Just as crucial to a clear understanding of the OFPA as its basic provisions are the basic
exceptions to those rules. The few exceptions which were written into OFPA were the result of intense
lobbying eorts by chemical input vendors, federal fund recipients, and the organic industry.36 Recognizing
these lobbying activities, it is remarkable to note that the very forces which helped to shape the original
statute in the realm of organic regulation are still at the center of the debate, and continue to be inextricably
involved in the National Organic Program's rulemaking process.
The exceptions found in the Act are not numerous, yet they are important. One example of an exemption
which has been continuously debated this decade is the small farmers exception, which states that small
organic farmers with less than $5000 in annual gross sales of agricultural products are exempt from the
certication requirements of OFPA.37 There are possible international implications of this exemption, as
will be explored in depth later. It is also important to read the text of the OFPA carefully and note that
nothing in the statute exempts organic foods from other federal food safety and production statutes like
the FDCA. Finally, OFPA's regulations do not aect farmers and food producers who truthfully claim that
their products are produced without pesticides, so long as they do not explicitly make organic claims.38
After obtaining a handle on the fundamental substantive content of the OFPA of 1990, we can move to an
examination of reactions to the drafting of this statute.
35West's Legal News Sta, Aubrey Organics Petitions FDA for Regulation of Organic Cosmetics, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS,
July 30, 1996, at 7726.
36Clark, supra note 10, at 324-325.
37Vaupel, supra note 4, at 142.
38Amaditz, supra note 1, at 544.
14B.
Scholars' Reactions
Perhaps due to the intense lobbying eort many constituencies throughout the drafting of the OFPA of 1990,
most of the interpretive comments after its enactment come from scholars rather than industry participants
themselves. Within the organic industry, in fact, the legislation was largely regarded as reasonable. One
commentator remarked that OFPA was \rooted in logic, rationality, and internal consistency... (it) may
represent the most commendable attempt yet to make statutory law imitate natural law."39
Scholars by and large feared that the statute, however, was not internally consistent. In particular, three
debilitating exceptions and clauses were cited as the most problematic areas of OFPA. The rst problematic
area dealt with consistency issues surrounding the state regulations and the NOSB eorts. Indeed, some
feared that additional state restrictions (coupled with the mandate that USDA must approve any that are
reasonable) would prevent the Act from achieving consistency and promoting interstate commerce. Related
to this concern was a feeling that the institutional eectiveness of the NOSB might be vulnerable to unwise
or contrary appointments.40
Scholars identied the second fundamental aw as potential consumer confusion over marketing, with the
ne distinctions between tiers not being apparent. For example, to the ultimate consumers of organic food,
the variation between a second tier organic food, containing 51% organic content, and a third tier organic
39Clark, supra note 10, at 331.
40Clark, supra note 10, at 346.
15food, containing 49% organic content, could appear to be much larger than the dierence in reality should be.
Two vastly dierent labeling requirements govern these two situations, and the typical American consumer
will not have enough of a knowledge base to make a truly informed decision on the content of the food he or
she is buying. Also contributing to possible consumer confusion is the lack of dierentiation by the OFPA
between organic foods as a class and other foods which vie for organic market share.
Finally, some scholars fear a potential conict between the OFPA and FDA labeling requirements. For
example, the FDA could theoretically require organic producers to include a statement that the FDA didn't
recognize organic foods as being safer or of higher quality than conventional foods.41 Note the discussion
below regarding the possible cooperation between USDA and FDA forces to strengthen federal organic regu-
lations. All three of the fundamental concerns expressed by scholars over the Organic Foods Production Act
as drafted have been subsequently expanded upon by commentators. We now turn to some of the suggestions
made thus far regarding ways in which the perceived inadequacies of the Act were seen to be candidates for
remedial action at future stages of the organic regulation process.
C.
Suggestions on Labeling Provisions
Commentators have called for an increased role for administrative ease in the implementation of OFPA.
They have suggested, for example, that there is no solid, defensible reason to draw a distinction between
41Amaditz, supra note 1, at 554-555. Amaditz appears to be fundamentally concerned about the fact that consumers consider
\organic" to be more than a production claim. Consumers purchase organic foods for reasons of nutrition, safety, quality, or
environmentalism. As such, the FDA could opt to restrict OFPA organic labeling claims for misleading consumers or concealing
material facts in these areas.
16second and third tier organics.42 As mentioned above, the importance of delineating the highest class of
organics is obvious for both incentive-providing reasons on the production side and information-gathering
reasons on the consumer side. The justications for a further break-down in organic labeling classications
is not so apparent. Perhaps, therefore, the administration ease resulting from dierentiating between only
two classes of organics would warrant a transition to this more simple model. Also addressing the future
administrability of the Act, the denitions of handling and processing could be drafted in a less confusing
manner. As written, these provisions would likely boggle the minds of not only the handlers and processors
themselves, but also the agency charged with implementing the rules.
While on the subject of institutional ability to enforce the Act, the nal broad labeling recommendation
moving forward from the OFPA is that the labeling provisions of the statute would be strengthened, the
argument goes, if the entire bureaucracy of the Agriculture Marketing Service (\AMS") were streamlined.
In particular, some commentators worry that the majority of AMS employees in 1990 were \mainstream
bureaucrats schooled primarily in agricultural economics with no experience in organic production."43 The
composition of the AMS is crucial because they are tasked with overseeing the entire National Organic
Program, and the smooth operation of this agency will improve all the labeling concerns which have been
expressed.
Within the overall labeling considerations, many opinions have been vocalized about the OFPA's interaction
with pre-existing state regulations on organic food labeling as well as pre-existing Food and Drug Admin-
istration regulations on food generally. A closer examination of these two issues reveals that the OFPA's
apparent clarity is misleading, and important questions remain on how to reconcile these areas of potential
42See the arguments presented above, which have been adapted from Amaditz, supra note 1, at 551.
43Clark, supra note 10, at 332.
17conict.
1. USDA Labeling vs. State Labeling. OFPA contains an unresolved allocation of labeling authority between
the state and federal governments. Original congressional intent is uncontroverted on this subject: \the
Committee clearly intends to preserve the rights of States to develop standards particular to their needs that
are additional and complementary to the Federal standards."44 In 1990, at the time of OFPA enactment,
some states had their own certication programs, some cooperated with independent certication organiza-
tions, and most states simply dened organic foods and specied permitted production techniques, but did
not provide any means of achieving organic certication.45 In sum, many constituents had looked forward to
national organic regulations precisely to supersede this medley of 33 private and 11 state organic certication
agencies, each with its own set of standards.46 Congress originally passed the OFPA to provide a uniform
federal certication law which would partially pre-empt current state laws, but which arguably provided
enough exibility to allow states to continue to serve their own interests. As such, although OFPA was not
designed to pre-empt the states entirely, the legislative history did indicate limits on how much authority
the states may exercise.47
Suggestions on ways to improve these complicated federal-state regulatory interactions focus on striking a
balance between a uniform national system and individual states' incentives to gain competitive advantages.
Specic recommendations for improving in this area concern the states' ability to promote their own organic
44S. REP. 101-357, supra note 11.
45Kyle W. Lathrop, Note, Pre-empting Applies with Oranges: Federal Regulation of Organic Food Labeling, 1991 J. CORP.
L. 885, 892-894 (1991).
46Pontacq, supra note 8, at A19.
47Lathrop, supra note 45, at 894. An interesting contrast can be made to the FDA. Within their regime, state regulation
of food labeling is preempted only when particular state actions make it impossible for food manufacturers to comply with
both federal and state law, or if those actions pose obstacles to accomplishing federal objectives. For more information on
the contrasts between FDA and USDA preemption statutes, see generally Charles P. Mitchell, State Regulation and Federal
Preemption of Food Labeling, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 123 (1990).
18products through \consumer education campaigns rather than by label campaigns."48 To facilitate the states'
advertising campaigns, reformers have called for the National Organic Program to delineate the interaction
of the \natural" and the organic labels with more certainty so as to avoid confusion with allowable state
organic labels.49
2. USDA Labeling vs. FDA Labeling. There has been much debate about the proper division of food
labeling regulatory power between the FDA and the USDA. In general, the USDA has the authority to
pre-approve, monitor, and enforce label regulations for meat, poultry, and eggs. The OFPA muddies this
relatively clear split of authority by granting the USDA all regulatory power over all organic foods|foods
traditionally within the jurisdiction of the FDA.50 Congressional intent was to grant USDA wide-ranging
authority, since \a consumer can nd organically produced fruits and vegetables, cookies, meat, soda, milk,
and cheese|almost any food product imaginable. It is the Committee's intention that this bill continue to
cover a wide range of food products."51 As such, although the FDA has apparent jurisdiction over organic
label regulation, OFPA mentions only a limited role for them.52 Only by removing such ambiguities will the
USDA be able to create the contemplated strong regulatory system.
Reformers specically call for the USDA and FDA to cooperate in order to clarify both the existing produc-
tion as well as advertising standards for the organic industry. The agencies working together can establish
rm standards for food claims such as \natural," \ecologically produced," \residue free," and \sustainable"
so that consumers can dierentiate organic products from these.53 Building on this cooperation, a strong
48Lathrop, supra note 45, at 910.
49Lathrop, supra note 45, at 916-919. Reactions to OFPA have also included a call for USDA itself to embark on a consumer
education campaign in order to convey the message that all OFPA organic foods may contain chemical residues and synthetic
inputs. See generally Amaditz, supra note 1, at 550-552. If the USDA had heeded this message, would the current backlash to
the National Organic Program's Proposed Rules been so negative?
50Lathrop, supra note 45, at 903.
51S. REP. 101-357, supra note 11.
52Lathrop, supra note 45, at 915.
53Amaditz, supra note 1, at 552.
19case can be made for joint agency lobbying of the FTC (which has traditionally been more tolerant of food
claims in advertising) for strict advertising standards based on a clear congressional intent to dierentiate
\residue-free" and other advertising claims from valid organic claims.54 If the agencies can work together,
eciencies of scale could be gained from cooperation on food labeling due to the fact the FDA already reg-
ulates this same food for adequate nutrition data, packaging statements, weight, origin, etc.55 Furthermore,
the FDA's concern with the possibility of false health claims is minimized because organic regulations do not
attempt to make scientic judgments. If adequate inter-agency cooperation is not attainable, some advocate
simply having the USDA transfer OFPA labeling authority for FDCA foods to the FDA directly.56
D.
Suggestions on International Implications.
The regulations found in the OFPA of 1990 are but a starting point for much more detailed provisions in
the National Organic Program's Proposed Rule. Even without the minute details, however, international
commentators in the early 1990s expressed grave concerns about the viability of such a federal regulation
scheme in the international marketplace. Most notably, the regulations could constitute a barrier to trade,
in contravention of the General Agreement on Taris and Trade (\GATT") if any OFPA provision operates
to treat foreign products less favorably than domestic products or to aord protection to domestic produc-
tion.57
54Amaditz, supra note 1, at 558.
55Amaditz, supra note 1, at 558. See also S. REP. 101-357, supra note 11.
56Amaditz, supra note 1, at 559.
57See generally Terence C. Centner, The United States' Organic Foods Production Act: Does the Small-Farmer Exception
Breach the United States' Obligations Under GATT?, 28 TULSA L.J. 715 (1993). To delve into more detail in the possible
GATT compliance problems, it is useful to split OFPA into sanitary and non-sanitary measures. OFPA's sanitary measures
are subject to scrutiny under the Agreement on Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (commonly referred to
as the \SPS Agreement.") Technical regulations that are not sanitary measures, such as labeling, packaging, or marketing
standards, are covered by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (commonly referred to as the \TBT Agreement.")
Franzen predicts that the OFPA regulations as drafted would violate both of these measures. See also Rick Franzen, Will
20In addition, the exception for small farmers may violate national treatment obligations because these indi-
viduals would be able to avoid the costs of preparing and submitting an organic plan for certication and
from having their products certied altogether.58 This possibility appears striking after an examination of
the relevant congressional history. Rather than providing a loophole that would lead small farmers to run
afoul of GATT, Congress expected that this exemption would \be used primarily by backyard gardeners
and hobbyists who sell produce at farmer markets and roadside stands to consumers within their communi-
ties."59 Clearly, the magnitude of the comments on international implications of the small farmer exemption
demonstrate that such \backyard gardeners and hobbyists" are not the individuals who in reality would be
taking advantage of the exception.
Commentators are particularly troubled by the fact that foreign organic programs with standards slightly
lower than the OFPA may not be recognized, and the OFPA makes no reference either to the FDCA
standards or the Codex Alimentarius, by which useful comparisons of various countries' organic regulations
could be compared.60 The Codex Alimentarius is an international organization charged with guiding and
promoting the establishment of denitions and requirements for foods in order to facilitate the growth of
international trade.61 Because its organizational goals appear to be in line with the original Congressional
intent behind the drafting of the Act, it is useful to keep the Codex guidelines in mind while examining the
progression of organic regulation drafting this decade.
GATT Take a Bite Out of the Organic Food Production Act of 1990?, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 399, 400-401 (1998).
58Centner, supra note 57, at 720.
59S. REP. 101-357, supra note 11.
60Franzen, supra note 57, at 421-422.
61Consumers International Position Paper, Comments and Response to Codex's Proposed Draft Recommenda-
tions for the Labelling of Foods Obtained Through Biotechnology, Apr. 24, 1998 (visited Jan. 7, 1999)
<http://193.128.6.150/consumers//campaigns/codex/CCFL-May98.html>.
21Importantly, some cases hold that even subtle distinctions between nations' regulations may be construed as
barriers to trade.62 In Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States Custom Service,63 the plaintis, domestic
packagers of frozen produce, sought to compel importers to comply with legal provisions64 that required all
foreign products to carry a conspicuous label indicating the country of origin. The court found that indeed
the country of origin markings were not located in a suciently conspicuous place, and this decision may as
a result force imported organic food to carry extra information related to foreign certication.
Inconsistencies between a proposed international inspection standard and a provision of the Poultry Products
Inspection Act65 formed the basis of a challenge in Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan.66 The Fifth
Circuit held that the proposed equivalency standard allowing poultry products that had been inspected
under standards \at least equal to" U.S. standards was invalid. Taking these cases together, we see that
very small and seemingly unimportant distinctions between international regulations may be construed by
American courts as barriers to trade. In light of the serious risk of such GATT non-compliance violations,
the United States could help to mold the international standard to reect the goals of the OFPA and thereby
promote increased international trade in organic products.67
IV. Reaction to National Organic Standards Board
62Centner & Lathrop, supra note 34, at 46-49.
63Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States Customs Service, 758 F. Supp. 729 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991), rev'd, 963 F.2d
356 (1992), vacated 790 F. Supp. 302.
6419 U.S.C. 1304(a) (1994). The provision states:
Marking of articles. Except as hereinafter provided, every article of foreign origin
(or its container...) imported into the United States shall be marked in a conspicuous
place as legibly, indeliably, and permanently as the nature of the article (or container)
will permit in such a manner as to indicate to the ultimate purchaser in the United
States the English name of the country of origin of the article...
6521 U.S.C. 451-70 (1994). The regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture would allow the entry of poultry
imports whenever the foreign inspection standards were \at least equal to" U.S. standards.
6631 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 1994).
67Franzen, supra note 57, at 429-430.
22A.
Overview of Composition
The National Organic Standards Board (\NOSB") was set up by section 6518 of the OFPA of 1990 to assist
in the development of standards for substances to be used in organic production and to advise the Secretary
of Agriculture on any other relevant aspects of the implementation of the Act.68 Before we can approach the
subject of what the National Organic Standards Board recommended to the USDA, we must rst understand
the composition of the board. The NOSB was originally established on January 24, 1992, with individual
members appointed for staggered appointments of 3, 4, and 5 years.69 It is a thirteen member panel of
organic experts and consumer and environmental advocates.70 Currently and more specically, the NOSB
is comprised of four growers, two handlers, three public interest advocates, three environmentalists, and a
scientist.71 The selection criteria included such factors as: demonstrated experience and interest in organics;
commodity and geographic representation; endorsed support of consumer and public interest organizations;
and demonstrated experience with environmental concerns.72 The current chairman of the board is Bob
Anderson.73
68AMS, Nominations for Members of the National Organic Standards Board, 61 FR 33897, July 1, 1996.
69Id. at 1.
70Organic Trade Association, A Guide to the Recommendations of the National Organic Standards Board (visited Jan. 5,
1999) <http://www/organic.org/7/guide/>. See also 1997 Testimony Before Congress, 1997 WL 154218 (F.D.C.H.) Note that
the OFPA originally called for the Board to be composed of \fteen members, of which four shall be individuals who own or
operate an organic farming operation; two shall be individuals who own or operate an organic handling operation; one shall be
an individual who owns or operates a retail establishment with signicant trade in organic products; three shall be individuals
with expertise in areas of environmental protection and resource conservation; three shall be individuals who represent public
interest or consumer interest groups; one shall be an individual with expertise in the elds of toxicology, ecology, or biochemistry;
and one shall be an individual who is a certifying agent as identied under section 6515 of the title." 7 U.S.C. 6518(b)(1)-(7)
(1990). Administrative ease is most likely the reason for the dierences between this plan and the actual implementation of the
NOSB.
71Susan D. Haas, Comment, A Real Organic Food Supply Would Avoid Irradiation and Toxins, ALLENTOWN MORNING
CALL, Apr. 19, 1998, at A21. See also S. REP. 101-357, supra note 11. Therein, OFPA suggested the appointment of more
specialized Technical Advisory Panels to provide scientic evaluations of the materials considered for inclusion on the National
List. Such panels were to include agronomists, entomologists, toxicologists, soil scientists, and others with appropriate expertise
in the area.
72AMS, supra note 68, at 1.
73Anon., National Organic Standards Board Recommends Antibiotics Ban in Organic Farming, FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Dec.
23The main task assigned to NOSB by the OFPA of 1990 was to issue recommendations on the forthcoming
National Organic Program Proposed Rule. The idea was to pool the collective experiences from a wide range
of professionals in the eld so that a balanced, fair, and scally responsible rule would eventually emerge.
Each area of expertise represented on the NOSB was necessary to draw upon in the drafting of the National
List and the recommendations for the ultimate regulations. In addition to the representative membership on
the board's impact on the NOSB recommendations, the composition of the Board continues to be important
to this day.
In the current stage of regulatory drafting, the renement of the National Organic Program's Proposed Rule,
we are seeing renewed activity by the NOSB. For example, in response to specic \issue papers" presented
by the USDA in reaction to widespread commentary on the Proposed Rule, the NOSB recommended in
December, 1998 that the USDA ban antibiotics in organic farming and allow the use of paraciticides only
under special circumstances.74 Within the last few months, the Board has also discussed certiers' ability to
discipline farmers who violate organic standards, and now plans to develop enforcement options which they
will subsequently submit to the USDA.75
B.
Overview of Recommendations
14, 1998, at 1.
74Id. at 1.
75Id. at 1. More specically, the board recommends that local, county or state ocials be given the authority to quickly
remove labels on products mislabeled as \organic" or, in the alternative, be able to prevent them to be sold. See generally
Anon., National Organic Standards Board Recommends Antibiotics Ban in Organic Farming, FOOD LABELING NEWS, Dec.
9, 1998, at 1.
24Unfortunately, delays in the issuance of recommendations by the NOSB were compounded by funding dif-
culties, bureaucratic confusion caused by the Bush-Clinton transition, and a determined NOSB eort to
allow for high levels of public participation.76 Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the NOSB was its
initial appointment: the Bush administration was openly hostile to the concept of organic agriculture and
delayed the appointment of the NOSB members until January, 1992. After all was said and done, the NOSB
took more than six years (dating from the enactment of OFPA) to compile hundreds of pages of technical
material, most of which has now largely been ignored.77
Of primary importance, the NOSB compiled a National List of acceptable synthetic substances and prohib-
ited natural materials for use on organic crops and livestock. The NOSB worked from the hypothesis that a
member could only propose a substance for inclusion on the list if the use of that substance was not harmful
to human health or the environment, it was necessary to the production or handling because other natural
substitutes were unavailable, and it was consistent with the overall process of organic farming and handling.78
The decisions on National List inclusions were made based on seven basic criteria: (1) the potential of such
substances for detrimental chemical interactions with other materials used in organic farming systems; (2)
the toxicity and mode of action of the substance; (3) the probability of environmental contamination during
manufacture, use, misuse, or disposal of such substance; (4) the eect of the substance on human health; (5)
the eects of the substance on biological and chemical interactions in the agroecosystem; (6) the alternatives
to using the substance in terms of practices or other available materials; and (7) its compatibility with a
system of sustainable agriculture.79 An examination of the substance of these requirements demonstrates
76Amaditz, supra note 1, at 545.
77Claire Cummings, Some Questions Raised by the Proposed USDA Organic Standards (visited Jan. 7, 1999)
<http://www.purefood.org/Organic/orgStdQues.html>. For a more thorough discussion of the ways in which the NOSB rec-
ommendations were ignored by the USDA when drafting their Proposed Rule, refer to the next section.
78Amaditz, supra note 1, at 541-542. While Congress recognized the importance of limiting the number of synthetics on the
National List, they also expressed an appreciation for their need in certain circumstances. For example, some organic farmers
use certain synthetic analogues to natural substances when those substances are dicult to obtain. The OPFA of 1990 was
carefully drafted with the intent of allowing narrow exceptions to the rule of no-synthetics, yet preventing widespread exceptions
of \loopholes." See generally S. REP. 101-357, supra note 11.
79AMS, Procedure to Submit Names of Substances for Evaluation for Inclusion in the National List To Be Included in the
25that the National List inclusions were to be decided upon in accordance with the original congressional intent
of the OFPA of 1990.
Notwithstanding the obvious appeal of the seven specied criteria for the National List, questions linger about
their wording. It strikes me as circular, for example, to proclaim as the goal of transcribing a \National
List" to be the ability to accurately categorize organic practices, while allowing a substance on the \List" if
it is consistent with organic farming! In addition to the enumerated list of situations for substance inclusion
on the National List, the substance must be used in the production of the organic food and fall within one of
approximately ten categories, or contain synthetic ingredients not of concern, or be used in handling while
not being synthetic.80 Again, I am perplexed by the inclusion of \synthetic ingredients not of concern" as
one way to make the accepted list, when I thought the professed goal of the National List was to inform
organic farmers and consumers of which synthetic ingredients were precisely not of concern, so as to make
them acceptable organic components!
Working from the foundation of the National List, the NOSB succeeded in recommending general organic
food labeling standards. By way of example, four of those standards are presented at this point, with
the knowledge that their content is representative of NOSB labeling considerations generally. First, non-
synthetic, non-organic agricultural products were allowed to be used in foods labeled as \organic foods"
unless listed as a prohibited material on the list.81 On the other hand, synthetically processed non-organic
agricultural products would not be used at all in organic foods labeled as such. A third labeling example
National Organic Program, 60 FR 15744, Mar. 27, 1995.
807 U.S.C. 6517(c)(1)(B)(i). These potential National List substances are those that contain an active synthetic ingredient in
one of the following such categories: copper and sulfur compounds' toxins derived from bacteria; horticultural oils; and livestock
parasiticides and medicines. See Amaditz, supra note 1, at 541-542.
81Anon., NOSB Issues Final Recommendations for Organic Program, FOOD LABELING NEWS, Feb. 1, 1996, at 1.
26is that NOSB also mandated that the organic food must be handled and processed by a certied organic
handler, again focusing on the process-oriented, as opposed to the product-oriented, stance of the organic
industry. The nal example concerning NOSB labeling provisions is that all non-retail containers of organic
products had to be correctly labeled, and all incidental processing aids had to be documented.82
Organic industry watchers felt that one of the most promising aspects of NOSB's labors was its attempt to
dene many industry \buzz words." Indeed, NOSB's nal recommendations contained proposed denitions
to words such as \organic," \genetically engineered," \killed microbial pesticide," \recombinant RNA and
DNA techniques," \synthetic," and \synthetic analogue."83 \Organic" was dened in its context as a labeling
term that simply denoted food that had been produced in accordance with the OFPA.84 Note the process-
based denition the NOSB accords to this important term; this demonstrates that the NOSB was adhering
to Congress' vision of organic as a means of production rather than a result.
The actual recommendations of the NOSB are lengthy and technical, and so I attempt here only to ag
some of the main recommendations which are often commented on by area experts and which arise again
with respect to the National Organic Program's Proposed Rule. First, the NOSB recommended that no
genetically engineered substances be allowed in organic foods.85 Also prohibited were the use of antibiotics
and parasiticides in organic livestock. However, questionable ingredients such as sulfur dioxide as a pro-
duction aid for organic wine, nutrient supplementation, and natural avors in organic foods were deemed
82Anon., NOSB at Odds with USDA Over National List Substances, FOOD LABELING NEWS, Aug. 3, 1995, at 1. See
also Anon., supra note 81, at 1.
83Anon., supra note 81, at 1.
84Amaditz, supra note 1, at 541.
85Anon., supra note 82, at 1.
27acceptable.86
In sum, the NOSB appears to have done a commendable job compiling the vast array of technical consid-
erations into a workable set of alternatives. Remembering that the ultimate goal of drafting the recommen-
dations was to guide the USDA in implementing actual regulations for their National Organic Program,
however, we cannot stop our analysis of the NOSB's success at the point of issuance of nal recommenda-
tions. It is necessary to go one step further and to examine how commentators (reacting in the time period
after the recommendations were issued but before December of 1997, when the Proposed Rule was issued)
viewed the realistic chances of the conversion of the NOSB's data from simply recommendations to bases for
the nal regulations.
C.
Realistic Chances of Implementing Recommendations
The feedback for the NOSB as a group has been mixed. Admittedly, reduced funding by the USDA made it
challenging for the Board to reach consensus on crucial issues such as organic food standards, production,
and accreditation.87 Even taking those administrative shortcomings into account, however, some critics
believe that the NOSB began the watering-down process of organic food regulation. One reaction was that
\long-term growth of organic farming can only be achieved by codifying high standards and eliminating
inappropriate practices and products, not by lowering standards and squeezing questionable inputs onto the
86Anon., supra note 82, at 1.
87Anon., supra note 82, at 1.
28National List, as the current NOSB seems determined to do."88 Other concerns were similar; now that
organic production was recommended to be regulated at three levels (federal, state, and certier), some felt
that producers would nd it dicult to actually know the requirements being imposed upon them.89
Much of the discussion about the realistic possibility of the USDA implementing the NOSB's recommenda-
tions stems from the continuing role of the NOSB and its interaction with the National Organic Program.
There was a meeting in October of 1998, for example, which was called precisely to give an opportunity to
the NOSB and USDA to discuss issues raised during the comment period on the proposed national organic
rule and to explore options for moving forward.90 The next full NOSB meeting will be held in Washington,
DC from February 9-11, 1999. The Board should take this and other such opportunities to stay involved
with the ongoing drafting process of the rules, as they have unique insight into each relevant issue after hav-
ing spent years at the drawing board while drafting comprehensive recommendations. Indeed, the NOSB's
involvement should not be seen as a step of the process that has already reached completion, but rather
should place the Board in an on-going, interactive, discussive role with other current actors in the organic
regulation debate.91
V. Reaction to Proposed Rule
A. Overview of Content
Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman announced the USDA's National Organic Program Proposed Rule
88Clark, supra note 10, at 345-346.
89Vaupel, supra note 4, at 140-142.
90AMS, National Organic Standards Board to Meet in Washington Oct. 27-29, Oct. 14, 1998 (visited Dec. 30, 1998)
<http://151.121.3.150/news/289b/htm>.
91For a more extensive treatment of the author's personal recommendations for moving forward in the organic regulation
drafting process, see the nal section.
29(hereinafter referred to as the \Proposed Rule") on December 15, 1997, one day before the rule was published
in the Federal Register.92 The overarching goal of the Proposed Rule was to improve consumer condence in
organic foods, as mandated by the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990.93 The text of the Proposed Rule is
lengthy and convoluted, yet it is possible to glean the crucial federal requirements which the Rule addresses.
For example, requirements are prescribed in the following areas: the production, handling and labeling
of organic foods; certication procedures for organic operations; accreditation of both state and private
certifying programs; compliance testing for organic programs; equivalency of foreign organic certication
programs; approval of state organic programs; and payment of user fees.94
The enormity of the USDA's responsibilities under the Proposed Rule with regard to the implementation of
these many federal requirements is striking. In sum, with a modest additional annual budget of $1 million
and a sta of only twelve, the USDA essentially would be charged with certifying the competence and
qualications of all private industry inspectors.95 Congress, in drafting the OFPA, obviously recognized
the scope of the agency's duties and as a result made a plea for reasonableness in the later drafting of
enforcement provisions. \In most cases previous experience in organic certication programs would provide
sucient expertise. The Committee does not intend that the Department establish accreditation standards
that are so rigorous as to be unnecessary for the skills required."96 As with many other original congressional
intentions, this desire for a rule built on ease-of-administration is not fully encompassed by the Proposed
Rule.
While still on the administrative side of things, the National Organic Program elected a new program leader
on February 11, 1998 named Keith Jones, a former wheat and cotton farmer as well as policy analyst for the
92USDA, Glickman to Announce National Organic Program Proposed Rule, Dec. 12, 1997 (visited Dec. 30, 1998)
<http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/12/0438>. 62 FR 65850, Dec. 16, 1997.
93Anderson, supra note 2, at 9.
94USDA, supra note 92, at 1.
95Anon., Editorial, Getting Old Organically, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 16, 1997, at 24.
96S. REP. 101-357, supra note 11.
30state of Texas.97 Jones currently has the dicult responsibility of structuring the comment period for this
Proposed Rule, as well as the more global task of implementing some workable structure for moving forward
from here.
Any structure which Jones brings to the current conundrum will be welcomed, and should be rooted in
the substantive provisions of the Proposed Rule themselves. Without getting too bogged down in the
complex language and requirements set forth in the National Organic Program's Proposed Rule, it is useful
at this point to mention some of the most widely debated provisions, in the hope that the massive swell of
constituents' comments and suggestions will be more easily comprehended against this baseline knowledge.
In the four primary areas described below, we see that at its most basic level the Proposed Rule has lowered
the requirements stated by both the OFPA of 1990 and the NOSB in their nal recommendations to the
USDA.
1. Most fundamentally, the Proposed Rule changes the denition of \organic" from exhibiting a focus on
the agricultural process in its entirety to an emphasis only on the end product.98
Organic. A term that refers to a raw agricultural product produced in accor-
dance with the Act and the regulations of this part; or, to an agricultural product wherein
organic agricultural products used as ingredients comprise between 95 percent and 100
percent of the total weight of the nished product, excluding water and salt; additionally,
the percentage of the total weight of the nished product, excluding water and salt, that is
not comprised of organic agricultural products is some combination of non-agricultural in-
gredients and/or non-organically produced agricultural products included on the National
List.
While this alteration is confusing in light of the traditionally prominent role of process management in all
of organic production, there has been some speculation that this denitional change is due to a desire on
97AMS, AMS Selects National Organic Program Leader, Feb. 11, 1998 (visited Dec. 30, 1998)
<http://151.121.3.150/news/044b.htm>. See also Martha Groves, Organic-Farming Advocate to Fill USDA Post Agri-
culture: Agency Taps Keith Jones to Lead Nation's Program, Establish Industry Rules, L.A. Times, Feb. 12, 1998, at
D3.
98Paul Schmelzer, Label Loophole: When Organic Isn't, THE PROGRESSIVE, May 1, 1998, at 28. See also Martha Brown,
Proposed Rules on Organic Farming Raise Hackles and Questions, COUNTRYSIDE & SM. STOCK J., July 1, 1998, at 40.
31the part of the USDA to mesh the Program's requirements within the current overall framework of US trade
policy.99
2. The Proposed Rule eectively erodes NOSB's statutory authority (as granted by the OFPA of 1990)
by altering the recommended National List and by ignoring or twisting NOSB's other recommendations in
the following areas: allowable syntethic material use; allowance of antibiotics in meat and poultry; lowering
of traditional organic standards for intensive connement of farm animals; use of non-organic animal feed
and other factory farm practices; prevention of private organic certiers from certifying and labeling organic
products using higher standards; and granting to the USDA the power to regulate or even prohibit eco-labels
of any kind.100 Interestingly, the USDA has described its substantive rules as being \similar" to the NOSB's
recommendations in a table entitled \Comparison of the Proposed National Organic Program Regulations
with the NOSB Recommendations and Representative State and Private Programs." Commentators dis-
agree, however, and have universally determined that such variations in the NOSB recommendations are
contrary to the original Congressional intent behind the granting authority of the OFPA of 1990.101
3. In various provisions of the Proposed Rule, the USDA has added \if necessary" and other similar dis-
cretionary language, which has the eect of adding loophole language which was never before included in
discussions.102 Note that this is in stark contrast with original congressional statements indicating that the
drafters of the OFPA wanted to avoid costly loopholes.103 The importance of these additions are evident,
as now certain organic producers and handlers can nd ways to circumvent the already-lowered standards.
4. In addition to straight regulation, the Proposed Rule also addresses the enforcement of those regulations.
Organic production will still be regulated at three levels: federal, state, and certier.104 For example, one
99Lilliston & Cummins, supra note 5, at 195.
100Schmelzer, supra note 98, at 28. See also Lilliston & Cummins, supra note 5, at 195. The complete modications of this
regulatory regime are contained at 62 FR 65885-65896, Dec. 16, 1997.
101Amaditz, supra note 1 at 553. See Table 4, 62 FR 65965-65966, Dec. 16, 1997.
102Schmelzer, supra note 98, at 28.
103S. REP. 101-357, supra note 11.
104Vaupel, supra note 4, at 140.
32source of federal power within the Proposed Rule arises from its authorization of a $10,000 penalty to be as-
sessed against those selling or labeling products that do not meet the prescribed standards.105 One wonders,
however, whether this enforcement mechanism is realistically possible. Consider the variation in federal and
state standards; now the substantive national standards are set far below any of the current state organic
programs, and the high standards already set in states such as California by their own organic foods laws
would be superseded.106 This debate over the interaction of federal and state enforcement regulations is
important, but even critics should remain mindful of the overriding benets of a federal system. The ip
side, of course, is that the Proposed Rule will help to mend the present hopelessly inconsistent patchwork
of state and private accreditation programs that exist on a state level.107
B.
Constituents' Reactions
The vocal reactions to the Proposed Rule have been loud and strong; over 275,000 comments ooded the
USDA during the prescribed comment period for the Rule, 99% of which atly denounced the Rule as
written.108 In an attempt to get a avor for the substance of these comments, I examine the specic reactions
of the following six distinct groups: (1) private and state organic certication programs, (2) environmental
groups and small organic farmers, (3) large agri-business, (4) politicians, (5) the NOSB, and (6) the consumers
of organic food as well as the voting public at large.
105Anderson, supra note 2, at 9.
106Anon., GMOs, Irradiated Foods, Sludge to be Dropped from Organic Rule, FOOD CHEM. NEWS, May 4, 1998. See also
Cummings, supra note 77.
107Rob Mahoney, Green Acres: The Organic Food Industry May Indeed Plow Its Way Into the Mainstream, But Not Without
Growing Pains, PREPARED FOODS, Sept. 1, 1998, at 46. Also, refer to previous section detailing the current regime of
certication and accreditation programs nation-wide.
108Organic Trade Association, OTA Calls Secretary Glickman's Surprise Announcement a Change in the Right Direction for
Consumers and Industry, July 22, 1998 (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://www.ota.com/news/htm>. See generally Lilliston &
Cummins, supra note 5, at 195.
33(1) Private and State Organic Certication Programs. The comments from the more than 40 currently
operating private and state organic certication programs109 reveal that this constituency is upset mostly
because the Proposed Rule would dictate that it would be illegal for organic certiers and producers to set
higher standards than the those found in the Rule.110 \These rules are so bad they give us an opportunity to
organize" said Michael Sligh, director of the Rural Advancement Foundation International upon rst reading
the Proposed Rule in January of 1998.111
In addition to federal preemption concerns, this constituency is upset with the Proposed Rule's shift away
from a process-based approach. On a fundamental level, private certiers take pride in focusing not only at
what goes into an organic product in terms of inputs, but also at how organic farmers manage their land
;112 as discussed previously, the Rule's shift away from a process approach is therefore not consistent with
this constituent's methodology. The suggestions on appropriate responses to this methodological shift vary.
Various legal arguments have emerged from the literature and document the reaction of the private and state
certiers, perhaps the most interesting being the theory that one could consider the substance of this Rule a
\takings" by the government of the intellectual property of the leaders who developed the present meaning
of the word \organic."113
(2) Environmental Groups and Small Organic Farmers. Environmental action organizations and small or-
ganic farmers have also been virtually united in their expressed displeasure for the Proposed Rule. This
109USDA, Remarks of Secretary Glickman re: Proposed Organic Standards, Dec. 15, 1997 (visited Dec. 30, 1998)
<http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/12/0443>.
110Lilliston & Cummins, supra note 5, at 195. Reference 62 FR 65914-65931, Dec. 16, 1997.
111Groves, supra note 97, at D3.
112Brown, supra note 98, at 40.
113Cummings, supra note 77.
34coalition has called on their members' lobbying support by politicizing a few of the \absolutely unaccept-
able" practices which would be condoned by the Rule, such as the use of germ-killing irradiation, the growth
of genetically altered crops and the spreading of sewage sludge as a fertilizer.114
One such organization, the Organic Trade Association, argued to its members that there are nine fundamental
threats to organic integrity imbedded in USDA's Proposed Rule. These threats have been articulated by
the OTA in the following way: 1) missing the \big picture" by eliminating key concepts in the denition
of \organic," 2) ignoring the recommendations of the NOSB (as detailed in section IV-B of this paper),
3) the possible inclusion of genetically-engineered organisms (\GEOs") in organic systems, 4) the possible
inclusion of food irradiation in post-harvest organic production, 5) the possible inclusion of biosolids (sewage
sludge), 6) a weak livestock section which as drafted simply gives too much leeway to the industry, 7) the
presence of unnecessary loopholes, 8) a weakened de-certication authority115 that could lead to products
which no longer meet organic requirements remaining on the market shelves for longer periods of time, and
9) ignoring historical land usage practices.116 These threats articulated by the Organic Trade Association
provide a representative example of the response which has been vocalized by the environmental and small
farmer coalition thus far.
(3) Large Agri-Business. The typical American small organic farmer shares the belief that the USDA is
114Michael Mansur, USDA's Proposals to Regulate Organic Foods Anger Farmers, Consumers, KANSAS CITY STAR, Apr.
28, 1998, at 1. See also Anderson, supra note 2, at 9. Note also that the Produce Marketing Association has said that the
application of irradiation or biotechnology is not appropriate at this time. Note generally Anon., Produce Group Opposes Use
of Irradiation, Biotechnology in Organic Production, FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Mar. 30, 1998.
115This particular concern about the lack of an eective de-certication authority was addressed by USDA's Issue Paper #3,
entitled \Termination of Certication by Private Certiers." The environmental groups and small farmer lobby is apprehensive
of placing private certiers in the impotent position of doling out perpetual certication licenses. For a more thorough discussion
of this Issue Paper, consult AMS, supra note 33.
116Organic Trade Association, supra note 108.
35prone to represent large agri-business interests rather than those of a small-time farmer.117 Many feel that
as a result the USDA has succumbed to big agri-business' lobbying to redene \organic" as only a standard
of identity, not a mark of exceptional safety.118 As this stereotype would predict, therefore, most large
corporations have been amenable to the Proposed Rule. Monsanto, the chemical super-giant, has advised
the USDA to back o temporarily on trying to include gene-altered products under organic label for a three
year period and then to try again.119 The FDA and the nuclear industry have similarly been lobbying USDA
for the wholesale nuclear irradiation of meat and other organic foods.120
In a similar attempt to protect a large industry's stake in organics, the Water Environment Federation
(WEF) declares biosolids among the safest and most complete organic fertilizers currently available, and
alleges that the negative reaction among small organic farmers is nothing more than the result of a \beauty
contest" not founded in science.121 It is interesting to note that as represented by these discrete examples,
the \large agri-business" constituency is very diverse, and encompasses many dierent interests which at
various times may compliment or detract from other interests within the larger group.
(4) Politicians. The politicians who had rst drafted the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, which
authorized the establishment of national standards, have sided with the organic farmers and generally share
their outrage at the Proposed Rules. The importance of maintaining the viability of a national regime for
the regulation of the organic industry is still obvious, and US Representative Sam Farr (D-Calif) notes that
117Mansur, supra note 114, at 1. See also Lilliston & Cummins, supra note 5, at 195.
118Pontacq, supra note 8, at A19.
119Lilliston & Cummins, supra note 5, at 195.
120Lilliston & Cummins, supra note 5, at 195.
121Anon., Water Environment Federation Responds to USDA, AP POLITICAL SERVICE, May 13, 1998, at 1. The Water
Environment Federation laid our forty years of research demonstrating that biosolids recycling benets agriculture. In fact, in
the past, the EPA, the FDA, the National Research Council, and the USDA itself have all declared that the use of biosolids is
safe and appropriate in the production of fruits and vegetables.
36\everything's riding on these rules."122 US Reps Peter DeFazio (D-Ore) and Jack Metcalf (R-Wash) agree
that USDA's current Proposed Rule represents a miscarriage of democracy, in light of the intent of Congress
when authorizing their drafting.123 By way of political comparison, the Clinton Administration is in a quite
dierent situation, and has been facing a unique political dilemma over the past year: how can administrators
claim that chemical-intensive agriculture, intensive connement of farm animals, and genetic engineering are
perfectly safe, and yet permanently ban those very practices under the federal organic label?124 It remains
to be seen how the lobbying eorts on both sides of this issue will inuence both the legislative and executive
branches of government.
(5) The NOSB. Former members of the NOSB, who had labored for years to provide the USDA with what
they thought were well-reasoned and comprehensive recommendations for regulations, have also reacted neg-
atively to the substance of the Proposed Rule. Board member Stephen Pavich, a California organics grower,
complains that he was \blind-sided" by the document.125 As Tom Stoneback, who served on the NOSB
from 1992-1996, explains, during the majority of NOSB's deliberations, \probably 95% of our (NOSB's)
votes were unanimous."126 This comment demonstrates that what was once clear support from industry
representatives on the substance of the recommendations had been transformed, through the drafting of the
Proposed Rule, to fragmented and conicting negative reactions. The eorts of the NOSB suddenly appear
to be a waste of time, and Stoneback remarked in April of 1998 that it only took the USDA one year to shop
these recommendations around Washington, and the resulting rule was \laughable."127
122Groves, supra note 97, at D3.
123See generally Schmelzer, supra note 98, at 28 and Anon., supra note 106. In addition, U.S. Senators Olympia Snowe and
Susan Collins condemned the original USDA Proposed Rule, and argued that the nation's consumers \deserve clear, common-
sense standards for food that will bear the organic label." Anon., Snowe, Collins Praise USDA Pledge to Review Proposed
Organic Standards, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, May 8, 1998, at 1.
124Lilliston & Cummins, supra note 5, at 195. Note that this political dilemma is caused by the confusion between safety and
nutrition claims in labeling, as discussed previously.
125Pontacq, supra note 8, at A19.
126Haas, supra note 71, at A21.
127Haas, supra note 71, at A21.
37(6) Consumers and the Voting Public. On a fundamental level, the voting public and consumers of organic
foods in general are disheartened by the fact that it has taken over eight years to even get this far in the
process of drafting national standards for the organic industry.128 Consumers rightly believe that when they
pay a premium for organic food, they are buying food that has been minimally processed without the use
of synthetic preservatives or additives.129 Now that the publicity has surfaced about the true nature of
the Proposed Rule issued by the National Organic Program, consumers are most likely so disillusioned and
distrustful of the USDA that many spectators fear they will no longer be willing to accept any compromises
on the substance of the Rule, regardless of how reasonable they are from an objective standpoint.130
From the beginning the USDA itself had proclaimed that they wanted this document to \serve as an in-
formed starting point for a very public debate|one that engages consumers, agriculture and the scientic
community."131 If there is truth to this statement, then the USDA's reaction to the strong response from
all three of their mentioned groups should be satisfaction, for a \very public debate" is exactly what has
ensued. The year of 1998 was entirely spent by the USDA reacting to the pushback of consumers, agriculture
and the scientic community. While initially very supportive of the criticism, USDA has recently become a
bit more defensive. The organization claims that a careful reading of the voluminous rule will reveal that
the controversial practices often denounced by the comments were not actually proposed, but rather were
mentioned only for consideration.132
128Anderson, supra note 2, at 9.
129Anon., Organic Standards Sprouting, BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, June 1998, at 133.
130Lilliston & Cummins, supra note 5, at 195.
131See generally USDA, supra note 109, at 1. For the rst time, AMS is providing one of the most open and accessible public
rulemakings in Federal experience|a fully electronic public drafting process via the internet. 1998 Testimony Before Congress,
1998 WL 879898 (F.D.C.H.).
132Mansur, supra note 114, at 1. See generally 62 FR 65850-65967, Dec. 16, 1997.
38The USDA is obviously feeling the uneasiness and skepticism with which their actions are looked upon, as
displayed by Mike Hankin, senior marketing specialist of the National Organic Program when he remarked
that \It's a matter of trust. If you're suspicious of us, no matter what we write or say, you'll look at it
with a critical eye. You've got to trust that we're writing the highest possible standard."133 At this point,
though, how realistic is it that all of the above mentioned constituencies will simply \trust" the USDA's
future actions with regard to the National Organic Program? At least the USDA has apparently turned to
using humor as a deection device. In fact, holding a hand-drawn paper target to his chest at a January
1999 conference, Keith Jones admitted that the federal agency failed the organic farmers in the past. \It
seems that in the current environment the USDA can't do anything right," he said, \but I can tell you today
we have a commitment to get it right."134
The most remarkable feature of the vocal debate which has ensued over the past year is the great diversity
of constituencies, but the relatively unied reaction of substantive unacceptability of the Proposed Rule. In
light of these tumultuous occurrences, the USDA is willfully blinding itself to the intensity of feelings on
this issue if they honestly believe that a cursory plea for institutional trust will solve a decade-long problem
which has personally embroiled hundreds of thousands of Americans. In summary, the various constituen-
cies' concerns about the USDA's current Proposed Rule can aptly be described as grave, and a suitable and
equally well-reasoned response by the USDA is warranted.
C.
Suggestions on International Implications
133Schmelzer, supra note 98, at 28.
134Anon., Organic Farmers Applaud Label Plan, CAPITAL TIMES, Jan. 22, 1999, at 2C.
39We now pick up on an issue previously examined in section III-D, the possible international implications of
the drafting of organic regulations. In addition to the GATT compliance issues addressed previously, the
international community has raised some interesting issues as a result of the release of the National Organic
Program's Proposed Rules. It is fascinating to compare the GATT compliance arguments made earlier with
regard to the OFPA of 1990 with those made now with regard to the Proposed Rule. Whereas previously
commentators worried that United States standards would be too high for other countries' producers to be
on equal footing with our own, those same commentators now worry that the United States standards will
be too low! This small example, therefore, illustrates just how dramatically the organic regulations have
shifted over the course of the decade.
For starters, the Codex Alimentarius wants to set international requirements for food aimed at ensuring that
the consumer has access to sound, wholesome products which are free from adulteration and are correctly
labeled.135 Codex has dened its responsibilities in terms of an obligation \to guide and promote the
elaboration and establishment of denitions and requirements for foods, to assist in their harmonization,
and, in doing so, to facilitate international trade."136 It is apparent, therefore, that the stated goals of
the Proposed Rule are in close alignment with those of the Codex organization as a whole. In fact, the
Codex Committee for Food Labelling will undertake in June of 1999 to adopt a set of \Draft Guidelines for
the Production, Processing, Labelling, and Marketing of Organically Produced Foods," whereby they will
dene the term \organic."137 Once these guidelines are released, the American organics industry will need
to closely compare the substantive requirements with those of the National Organic Program, and ensure
that the regulations in the United States are not materially lower than those established by Codex.
135Consumers International Position Paper, supra note 61.
136Consumers International Position Paper, supra note 61.
137Note that in addition to Codex's forthcoming denition, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) has suggested an international denition of \organic". FAO's Committee on Agriculture, Organic Agriculture, Agenda
for Meeting Jan. 25-29, 1999 (visited Jan. 4, 1999) <http://www.fao.org/unfao/bodies/coag/coag15/x0075e.htm>.
40In addition to the obvious tension caused by Proposed Rule standards which are actually lower than those
of some of our trading partners in Europe and Japan,138 such that our standards would not be acceptable to
many foreign governments and private certication groups,139 the United States now confronts three potential
problems within the greater international organic community. First of all, Codex and other international
organizations have repeatedly stressed the fundamental right of consumers world-wide to mandatory labeling
of genetically-engineered foods (\GEOs"), and note that over 100 countries have already implemented such
mandatory legislation.140 The Proposed Rules' inclusion of GEOs, therefore, is not in keeping with the
traditional position of the United States at the forefront of health and safety issues. The second problem stems
from the United States' inclusion of irradiation in the Proposed Rule, which is likely to create international
trade problems, since Codex Alimentarius drafts prohibit this technology in organic foods.141 Similarly, the
third potential problem which has been agged by the international community is the use of biotechnology
having been approved in organics under the Proposed Rule. The existing Codex drafts would also prohibit
this technological device in organic food.142
The variation in acceptable technological inputs are especially problematic because an exported product's
certication must meet the buying nation's accreditation requirements. This is a notoriously complicated
and expensive process, and has led to calls that trade could be made easier not only be a comprehensive
138Cummings, supra note 77. It is ironic that the congressional intent throughout the budget allocation process in 1998 was
still to provide nomenclature and standards for organic production which would facilitate the international marketing of U.S.
organic products. See generally 1998 Testimony, supra note 131. It appears that the USDA has nally acknowledged the
disconnect between congressional goals and reality, yet Congress itself seems reluctant to admit it.
139Brown, supra note 98, at 40. Reference 62 FR 65934-65935, Dec. 16, 1997.
140Julian Edwards, Statement Delivered Before the Codex Committee on Food Labelling, May 26-29, 1998 (visited Jan. 7,
1999) <http://193.128.6.150/consumers//campaigns/codex/jedwards.html>. See generally Lilliston & Cummins, supra note 5,
at 195.
141Anon., supra note 114. See also AMS, supra note 33.
142Anon., supra note 114.
41revision of the Proposed Rule, but also through an implemented National Organic Program relationship with
USDA's Foreign Agricultural Services (FAS). Cooperation between these two agencies would facilitate the
drafting of organic rules which would take into account technological input requirements of various nations.
Thus far, however, no cooperation between the two branches has occurred.143
VI. Looking Forward
A.
Generalizations
It appears that although the opinions of the various interest groups have waxed and waned throughout the
drafting process over the course of a decade, the drafters' intent has remained constant. On December 17,
1998, Dan Glickman reminded us all of the USDA's commitment to enacting organic regulations grounded
in this ultimate concern for consumer safety. He said that his department would focus on a number of key
priorities in 1999, one of which was the issuance of national organic standards that are good both for farmers
and consumers.144
An examination of the totality of the comments generated in each of the three stages enumerated above
reveals that the organic industry is currently galvanized into one strong lobby for the rst time in history.145
Whether the strength of this lobby will continue to play an instrumental role in the continuing eort to
draft regulations for the National Organic Program remains to be seen, but we have no reason to doubt the
143AMS, supra note 33.
144Andy Solomon, Glickman Touts 1998 Accomplishments, Sets Priorities for 1999, Dec. 17, 1998 (visited Dec. 30, 1998)
<http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1998/12/0516>.
145Brown, supra note 98, at 40.
42continuing inuence of this coalition.
B.
Expectations for the Next Proposed Rule
A variety of public statements have been made by USDA and National Organic Program representatives re-
garding their expectations for the future procedures in implementing the regulations. The most fundamental
question at this point is whether the USDA intends to move straight to the issuance of a Final Rule, or instead
will issue a second draft of the Proposed Rule, to be followed by another comment period, before moving on
to the drafting of a nal rule. It appears at this point that the later option will be chosen, although its not
yet clear whether the second draft would be released by the Oce of Management and Budget or directly to
the public through the Federal Register.146 We do know that a proposed timeline (generated in December
1998) predicts that the next draft will appear in mid-1999,147 with both the schedule and method for the
second public comment period being announced when the those revisions are released publicly.148 After
the Proposed Rule is nally accepted, the USDA will begin accrediting representatives of state agricultural
departments and private persons who will inspect producers and handlers to certify compliance with the
organic program.149
146Anon., Organic Proposed Comment Period Closes This Week, USDA's Role Questioned in Re-Write Eort, FOOD &
DRINK WEEKLY, Dec. 14, 1998, at 1. The organic farming coalition appears to agree with this tactic. Katherine DiMatteo,
executive director of the Organic Trade Association (OTA) stated in December of 1998 that it would be more appropriate to
allow the USDA to re-write its original organic proposal rather than to provide the department with a list of complaints with
which to work. She believes that this strategy will ultimately allow for greater latitude in the revision process. See also Organic
Trade Association, supra note 108.
147Anon., supra note 146, at 1.
148Anon., Organic Standards Regrown, BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, Aug. 1998, at 80.
1491997 Testimony Before Congress, 1997 WL 133699 (F.D.C.H.).
43What can we expect substantively? Most informed Washington sources predict that the second draft will
be a compromise which will lower the standards somewhat from the initial NOSB recommendations while
trying to avoid setting o the kind of massive backlash that was triggered by the current Proposed Rule.150
Indeed, the USDA says that the Final Rule will be just such a compromise rule, something the organic
industry must \swallow for the good of the economy and the bottom line of the food sector."151
Jones has given use some hints about the specics on the next NOP rule. At an April 1998 brieng between
about fty industry ocials and the United States' delegation to the Codex Committee on Food Labeling, he
stated that Dan Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture, had \pretty much ruled out" including genetically mod-
ied organisms, irradiated foods and crops fertilized with sewage sludge.152 This conjecture was cemented in
Keith Jones' presentation to farmers at the Ecological Farming Conference in January, 1999.153 Similarly, in
July of last year, Glickman himself assured the NOSB that the new rule would include no synthetic material
that had not been previously approved by the NOSB.154
On more general terms, Jones has announced that the USDA will adhere to six guiding principles when
working on the National Organic Program's regulation: 1) keep it simple; 2) make it enforceable; 3) make
it defensible; 4) focus on accredited certiers; 5) ensure consistency; and 6) minimize costs to the industry
for certifying food as organic.155 It remains to be seen how these principles are implemented throughout the
coming year in the search for a workable Final Rule. Recognizing the poignancy and importance of each of
these concepts, I hope to use these principles as the background framework for generating options on how
to move forward on the next Proposed Rule.
150Lilliston & Cummins, supra note 5, at 195.
151Lilliston & Cummins, supra note 5, at 195.
152Anon., supra note 106.
153Martha Mendoza, USDA Rules on Organic Food Labels, AP ONLINE, Jan. 22, 1999, at 1. See also Cathleen Ferraro,
Federal Rules Tighten Denition of \Organic" Food, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIBUNE BUS. NEWS, Jan. 22, 1999, at 1.
154Organic Trade Association, supra note 108.
155Organic Trade Association, supra note 108.
44C.
Suggestions for the Next Proposed Rule
We have come full circle. The drafters of OFPA who once argued for the need to end the turmoil in the
organics industry are currently again vocalizing their suggestions on how to progress past the current turmoil.
These lawmakers say that rather than starting over, the USDA should work with the organic industry and
all the relevant interest groups to revise the current proposal \and give far more consideration to consumers'
preferences and customary practices in the growing organic food market."156 Not everyone supports revising
the current proposal, however, and the USDA still receives requests to scrap all the previous work, and to
concentrate on current California law as a model of sensible and workable organic food regulations. In light
of these varying concerns, I have compiled a series of both procedural and substance-based steps that the
USDA should take in order to improve the second draft of their National Organic Program Proposed Rule.
1. Procedural Recommendations. As the presence of a vocal minority of organic farmers who call for the
USDA to scrap the Proposed Rule illustrates, one unresolved issue is how much deference the USDA should
give to the onslaught of comments which continues to stream into National Organic Program headquarters.157
After all, each individual comment is signicant in that its author has enough interest in the current debate
that s/he took the time to write to the USDA. It should be recognized, however, that not every comment
must be incorporated into the next Proposed Rule. It is true that it has been my working hypothesis
156Anon., supra note 106.
157Many interest groups are sending renewed calls for revision daily. For example, the Organic Trade Association's Quality
Assurance Council recently lobbied the USDA with a specic set of nine threats to the organic industry encompassed by the
Proposed Rule. See Organic Trade Association, supra note 108.
45throughout this paper that if more institutional energy had been invested in the incorporation of valid
comments into the various stages of regulatory drafting, the Proposed Rule in existence today would be
much more representative of industry wishes and subsequently much more acceptable to all relevant interest
groups. Assuming the presence of these benets from incorporating comments into the second draft, how
should the evaluation of this ood of commentary be eciently managed? Where should we draw the line?
The sheer magnitude of interest is staggering, and this interest will no doubt continue. As one op-ed author
phrased her plea for audience activism, \how many citizen comments might it take to convince the USDA
to return to the NOSB's recommendations? Why gamble?"158
My suggestion is that the USDA take this opportunity, while meeting behind closed doors and attempting
to shape the second Proposed Rule into a workable regulatory regime, to not be preoccupied with the
outlying opinions which are expressed, such as the calls to scrap all previous eorts this decade. Rather,
the USDA should evaluate the common themes and interests expressed in the majority of reactions to the
current Proposed Rule. If the agency can synthesize the comments into universally-held principles, and then
progress to the next step and ground all the specics of their regulations in these principles, their chances
of achieving success will increase tremendously. I feel that a broad-based, collective evaluation of the data,
such as that which I attempted to undertake throughout this paper, is the only way to escape from the
destructive cycle of negative feedback and institutional nger-pointing that currently plagues the organic
regulatory debate.
158Haas, supra note 71, at A21.
46In addition to my procedural recommendation that the USDA undertake a systematic incorporation of
broadly-supported comments into the next Proposed Rule, procedures need to be implemented with re-
gard to the USDA's interaction with the NOSB and its own sub-agency, the Agricultural Marketing Service
(AMS). I believe that the USDA should allow the NOSB rather than a potentially politicized Secretary of
Agriculture to govern the National List of allowable substances, especially given that this arrangement is
in line with original congressional intent.159 I am pleased with the recent renewed cooperation between the
USDA and the NOSB, and by drawing on the expertise and prior recommendations of this Board, the second
Proposed Rule should be much more in line with original congressional intent.
Similarly, the NOSB can be utilized to assuage concerns about the Agricultural Marketing Service as an
institution. In order to address concerns regarding the ability of the AMS to adequately oversee the organic
regulations' revision and implementation process, NOSB's role could be expanded to one of an expert consul-
tant panel. If the organic community felt more condent that the AMS would turn to NOSB with technical
questions about the revised Proposed Rule, it would feel more condent about the substance of the Rule
generally. AMS can also internally take steps to ensure that its decision-making employees understand the
legislative history throughout this decade, so that they will not repeat the mistakes of blatantly disregarding
congressional intent.
2. Substantive Recommendations. As far as specic substantive recommendations for moving forward, I
believe a number of changes should be made to the existing Proposed Rule. On a broad scale, I believe
that if the USDA would turn back to a process-based, rather than an end-product focused approach to
the Proposed Rule, many of the substantive failings of the current draft would be alleviated. Specically,
an adherence to original congressional intent regarding small loophole provisions and the equality of state
and international regulations will lead to meaningful substantive changes in the National Organic Program
159Haas, supra note 71, at A21.
47Proposed Rule.
First of all, I believe that the vast majority of GATT-related international regulatory problems could be
resolved if the rule closed the loophole for small farmers. Obviously the backyard farmers and hobbyists
are not the individuals which the international regulations are geared to aect, and so aligning international
standards with a more suitable domestic denition of \small farmer" would reduce the inequities between
international and national standards. Of course I agree that backyard organic farmers should not be subject
to the Proposed Rule's complex certication requirements, but perhaps a gure lower that the current $5,000
yearly intake is needed.
Secondly, the USDA must take steps to address more broad concerns about the interaction of federal organic
regulations with both existing international and state regulations. The drafters of the next Proposed Rule
should raise the level of all regulations to at least those suggested by Codex and other relevant international
organizations. In keeping with existing international organic standards, the American Rule should not allow
genetically-engineered foods, irradiation, or biotechnology in their fundamental organic regulatory scheme.
The elimination of these major discrepancies will alleviate the current trade barriers. Additionally, the
USDA would adequately respond to expressed concern about the possibility of substantively variable state
regulations with the implementations of higher overall regulations. This would result in less concern about
individual state restrictions upending national consistency in the organic market.
In conclusion, the USDA is currently conducting extremely important discussions behind closed doors;
discussions that will directly impact the future of the organic industry in the United States. The goal at
this stage in the process of implementing workable organic regulations should be to synthesize the valuable
48insights which can be gleaned from the events of the past decade into a compromise rule. The common and
recurrent themes of constituent reactions must be considered by the USDA. Without undertaking rigorous
academic and practical review of the constituency reactions at each stage of the regulatory process, the
USDA will loose out in the end.
Just as I developed throughout this paper, the USDA should move through each of the four analytical stages
of their review. First, they should obtain a substantively accurate summary of the Organic Foods Production
Act of 1990, the recommendations which were issued by the National Organic Standards Board, and the
current National Organic Program's Proposed Rule. Secondly, they should review the positions of various
interest groups at each stage of this process. The third stage of action which the USDA should undertake is
to synthesize the representative comments and suggestions from these relevant constituencies so that broad-
based policies can be extrapolated. Finally, the drafters of the next Proposed Rule should incorporate the
interest group comments and congressional intent into the substantive provisions which they are currently
writing. I am condent that if this decision-making framework is employed by the USDA, a comprehensive,
enforceable, and broadly-supported organic regulatory regime can be implemented. The time has come for
organic regulations to become a reality.
49